The actual tile of this piece should have been (but I had a character limit): Belief In God Can Be Rationally Justified Without Needing Inferential Argument/Reason/Evidence...

----------

This article will be making the case for how one could have a rationally justified belief in God wholly apart from having any inferential argument/reason/evidence to justify that belief. I will not be --de facto-- arguing the case that such a rationally justified belief does indeed exist (at least not until my own personal thoughts and experiences section), rather, I will be showing how such a rationally justified belief in God is possible.

I previously wrote a separate article which has a similar theme, so I will post the url link to this separate article below. In this separate article I demonstrate how one could show a proposition to be rationally justified over its negation/opposite. Here is the link to that said article:
https://www.facebook.com/notes/atheist-answers/how-belief-in-a-propositi...

I will be dividing this article into numerous sections in order to convey various philosophical points. It is highly recommended that one read through all the points, since the crescendo of the article heavily relies on the preconditional frame of mind these former philosophical points establish.

----------1: Beliefs, Reason & Rationality----------

I am going to very crudely and basically articulate a working definition of beliefs, reason and rationality (this is only a working definition for shared understanding concerning the rest of the article).

There exists:

(A) Beliefs.
(B) Reasoning.
(C) Logic (as in the laws of logic) and Rationality (as in the rules of rational inference).

'Reasoning' is how we hold/link beliefs together, and also with 'reasoning' we can infer new beliefs from previously held beliefs. 'Logic' and 'Rationality' only check the validity of that chain of 'Reasoning' (and if that chain of reasoning is sound, we will say that reasoning is 'Rationally Justified'). We can also use rationality to check if non-inferential beliefs are justified, based on the deliverance's of reason (basically meaning we can have a rational epistemic model which justifies 'non-inferential beliefs' - this will be explained later).

You will probably find that a lot of people like to think/claim the beliefs they hold are rationally justified. Below are three reasons why that may be...

(A) Beliefs which are rationally justified are far more likely to be true; and the aim in holding a belief is to hold a true belief.
(B) They have the moral belief/conviction that a human is morally obligated to talk/think/act reasonably, rationally and logically. That one is acting immoral by being (willfully) irrational.
(C) They just happen to have a preference to be seen as rational. Maybe they think others will respect/like them more if they are seen as rational.

----------2: Belief Forming Mechanism----------

Again I am going to be very crude and basically articulate a working definition. The belief forming mechanism has many aspects to it and many categories to it. I am only going to create five categories (though there are more) and in each category use (about) one aspect of a belief forming mechanism as an example (though there are many per category).

(A) Sensory experience (this does not just mean physical senses): This is any experience which tells us (gives us information/data) about the reality of ourselves or the reality outside ourselves.
(B) Perception of the mind: This is the perception which forms in the mind from the sensory experience (see above).
(C) Beliefs of the mind: This is the part of our mind where we happen to just find ourselves forming/holding various beliefs (although with different strengths).
(D) Reflective, imaginative and the reasoning part of the mind: This is the part where we reflect on what we believe, think about concepts and form new beliefs via inference etc...
(E) Rational and logical part of the mind: These are our rules of thought. This is the part of our mind where we reflectively use rationality to check whether these beliefs we happen to find ourselves with are held for rational or irrational reasons (and we strongly believe in rationality because of our experience/acquaintance with it, if we find ourselves holding a belief which is irrational, we will then probably also find ourselves not holding this belief anymore).

----------3: Knowledge----------

There are various models of knowledge. The most common is the JTB model (Justified.True.Belief). The JTB models says for person (X) to have knowledge of (A), there must be these three components...

(1) Person (X) must first have a belief about (A).
(2) Person (X) must have a rationally justified reason for believing (A).
(3) Belief (A) must be true.

...only if all three components are in place does person (X) have knowledge of (A).

For example, person (X) could have (1: A belief the earth is a sphere) and (3: This belief is true) but not have (2: Person (X) holds this belief for the silly reason that he thinks the earth is an egg); in this case person (X) did not know (A).

It should be noted that there is a lot more to knowledge than what I have merely stated here. I will also add that this article is not going to be concerned with the criteria of knowledge, but rather just with whether belief in God can be rationally justified apart from inferential argument/reason/evidence.

----------4: Rational Justification----------

The ancient Greek philosophers noted three ways Rational Reasoning could go when one is justifying their beliefs. An example of this:

(1) "I believe (A) because of (B), and I believe (B) because of (C), and I believe (C) because of (D)...etc...[ad infinitum].” There are many philosophical problems in using such an approach for justifying beliefs. However, I think most people can by intuition alone see immediate problems with such a method, so I will not state all the philosophical issues (as they are deep and would take some time). However, epistemic models based on such an approach to rational justification are called 'Infinitism.'

(2) "I believe (A) because of (B), and I believe (B) because of (C), and I believe (C) because of (A)," and there we have circular reasoning. There are many philosophical problems in using such an approach for justifying beliefs. However, I think most people can by intuition alone see immediate problems with such a method, so I will not state all the philosophical issues (as they are deep and would take some time). However, epistemic models based on such an approach to rational justification are called 'Coherentism.'

(3) "I believe (A) because of (B), and I believe (B) because of (C), and I believe (C) because it is a foundational belief which is not inferred from any other belief more foundational than itself (thus this line of reasoning goes no further)." Epistemic models based on the above are called 'Foundationalsim.' A version of this epistemic model for justification/knowledge is what I am basing this article on.

----------5: Foundationalism: An Epistemic Model Of Rational Justification/Knowledge----------

This will be a section about a certain version of (mere) Foundationalism.

Foundationalism recognizes two types of beliefs:

(A) Non-inferential beliefs (these are also known as 'foundational beliefs' and 'basic beliefs;' however, when these non-inferential beliefs are considered rationally justified, they are also known as 'properly basic beliefs'): these are beliefs we just happen to find ourselves with, which were not inferred/formed from any other beliefs we previously held.

(B) Inferred beliefs: these are beliefs we inferred with our reasoning from other pre-existing beliefs we hold.

There are different types of foundationalism in regards to which non-inferential (‘basic’) beliefs are rationally justified. The criteria for this is usually based on the way in which these non-inferential beliefs were formed, this is what dictates whether they are rationally justified non-inferential beliefs (‘properly basic’) or not. Usually the accepted criteria for rationally justified non-inferential beliefs, are beliefs which were formed in the context of experience.

I will give an example of a ‘properly basic belief’ (a non-inferential belief which is rationally justified): Suppose I am walking down the street and I see my friend Trevor walk past me, I would then (most likely) form the belief that my friend Trevor just walked past me. This belief would be a 'non-inferential belief' as it was not inferred from any other belief I previously held, also it would be a belief which was formed in the context of experience, so it would be a ‘properly basic belief.’ So beliefs rooted in experience which give us information about ourselves or the reality outside ourselves are rationally justified 'foundational/basic beliefs.'

I will now give an example of an inferred belief: I do not have a non-inferential belief that the moon has craters on the back side of it, but I have an inferred belief that there are craters on the back side of moon; this belief came about from my reasoning/inferring to it from other previously held beliefs.

Foundationalism holds that a basic belief is rationally justified in the absence of any defeaters. A defeater is a belief which is opposed to the belief in question and which enjoys more justification/warrant than the belief in question (except in the case of an intrinsic defeater-defeater, but I will get to this later).

A defeater to a belief can act in two ways:

(1) FIRST WAY: It is a belief which is opposed to the current belief in question, and this opposing belief has more rational justification/warrant than the current belief in question (this defeater belief can be both a non-inferential belief or an inferential belief).

An example of this: when someone sees a straight straw go into a glass of water (for the first time) they will most likely form the belief that the straw is now bent; this belief of a bent straw is basic, since it was formed in the context of experience/sight. However, later on this same person may find that they now form the opposite belief (that the straw in the glass water is not bent, but straight) based on other experiences (like feeling it), or based on inferential reasons like the scientific study of light refraction. If the belief in a straight straw (when in a glass of water) has reasons for its belief which are more rationally justified/warranted than reasons for the belief the straw is bent, then this new belief acts as a defeater to the old belief.

(2) SECOND WAY: It is a belief (X) which holds that the mechanism belief (A) was formed via, is unreliable.

An example of this: Let’s say that I have the belief someone is touching the back of my neck because I feel it. However, I then read the side-effects label on the bottle of some medication I am taking and one of the possible side effects is that I might hallucinate a feeling of being touched on the back of my neck. Now, whenever I form the belief someone is touching the back of my neck because I feel it, I have a defeater to the mechanism which formed that belief; the defeater tells me the mechanism which is forming the belief is unreliable.

To summarize: a belief formed via proper basicality is a rationally justified belief; indeed, one is rationally obligated to have this belief in the absence of a rationally justified defeater. An example of a rationally unjustified defeater would be something like wishful thinking; wishful thinking is a mechanism which does not give information in the experience of itself, so if one applies it as a defeater to a belief they don’t like --to try and suppress and eradicate that belief from their mind for example-- then they would be acting irrationally.

For my last point on this section, I want to bring up the issue of an ‘intrinsic defeater-defeater.’ This is nothing more than to basically say I could hold a belief (X) which has a defeater brought against it --call it belief (A)--, and I might have no answer as to why belief/defeater (A) is false, yet I could still be rationally justified not to drop my belief (X), if my belief (X) is an ‘intrinsic defeater-defeater.’ For belief (X) to be an ‘intrinsic defeater-defeater.’ to belief/defeater (A) brought against it (which I have no answer to), all that belief (X) has to have is more justification/warrant than belief (A).

Philosopher Alvin Plantinga gives a thought experiment to demonstrate this. He says imagine a young man dragged into a court room for the charge of murder. Now this young man knows very powerfully that he did not do the crime and where he was at the time (based on his experiences). However, the evidence being presented against him he has no answer to, and if he was on the jury he would convict himself of being guilty. However, he knows he did not do it, even in the absence of an answer to the evidence being brought against him. The young man in this case would have an ‘intrinsic defeater’ to the ‘defeater’ brought against the belief of his innocence. He would be rationally justified to still hold his initial basic belief (that he is innocent), even in the absence of an answer to the defeater against it.

----------6: The Sensus Divinitatis & The Witness Of The Holy Spirit----------

The Sensus Divinitatis and the Witness Of The Holy Spirit are two possible ways a person could form a properly basic belief in/about God. I will give a quick explanation of each one.

(1) FIRSTLY: The Sensus Divinitatis...

...is a natural sense that God exists. This could be a sense rooted in ones perceptional part of the mind, so that under certain circumstances --say when looking at a beautiful sun set or the face of ones new born child-- the Sensus Divinitatis will form the non-inferential belief, ‘God did that,’ or, ‘Divinity is behind that,’ or, ‘God is good and glorious’ etc...

Another possible way the Sensus Divinitatis could act as a belief forming mechanism might be similar to something like our experience of beauty (axiology). Our experience of beauty is a qualitative experience, which builds on a quantitative experience; for example my sight tells me that my wife is in front of me (quantitative experience), however, my axiological experience tells me that what I see in front of me is beautiful (qualitative experience).

So too, the Sensus Divinitatis could be another layer of qualitative experience (perhaps even built on top of the experience of beauty itself) which forms non-inferential beliefs in/about God in various circumstances.

These are just some quick thoughts on the issue to get the basic idea across.

(2) SECONDLY: The Witness Of The Holy Spirit...

...is the presence/witness of God. This Witness may form non-inferential beliefs in and about God; it may also form non-inferential beliefs like ‘the Christian Gospel is true,’ and/or ‘Jesus Christ is God’s Son,’ and/or ‘I have been forgiven’ etc... The Witness could even (perhaps) lead one to information in order to form certain beliefs, rather than directly being the cause of their forming.

The Witness may be sensed while forming these non-inferential beliefs, however, it may not necessarily always be sensed; perhaps sometimes the Witness might form these non-inferential beliefs in the context of a strong conviction (beliefs like: “The Gospel is true”) without one sensing the Witness being the cause (however, in this case the person who formed the belief would not know directly that it was the Witness which was the cause of these non-inferential beliefs; all they will know is that they have a strong conviction proposition (X) is true).

----------7: Philosopher(s) Dr Craig and Dr Plantinga’s Thoughts Concerning the Sensus Divinitatis & The Witness Of The Holy Spirit----------

Concerning the Witness Of The Holy Spirit...

...philosopher Dr William L. Craig states:

// I have elsewhere characterized the witness of the Holy Spirit as self-authenticating, and by that notion I mean (1) that the experience of the Holy Spirit is veridical and unmistakable (though not necessarily irresistible or indubitable) for the one who has it and attends to it; (2) that such a person does not need supplementary arguments or evidence in order to know and to know with confidence that he is in fact experiencing the Spirit of God; (3) that such experience does not function in this case as a premise in any argument from religious experience to God, but rather is the immediate experiencing of God himself; (4) that in certain contexts the experience of the Holy Spirit will imply the apprehension of certain truths of the Christian religion, such as “God exists,” “I am reconciled to God,” “Christ lives in me,” and so forth; (5) that such an experience provides one not only with a subjective assurance of Christianity’s truth, but with objective knowledge of that truth; and (6) that arguments and evidence incompatible with that truth are overwhelmed by the experience of the Holy Spirit for the one who attends fully to it. //
- Dr William L. Craig

It is Dr William L. Craig's belief that the Lord will never leave His children in a position of not being rationally justified to believe in Him (the Lord does not call the Christian to be irrational). So for those Christians who do not have the spare leisure time to look into all the issues, but have defeaters brought against their belief in God (and the things of God); if they are walking in Christ, God will assure them of how real He is through the Holy Spirit. But the Christian must attend to this work of the Holy Spirit in him, by walking in fellowship with Christ.

Concerning the Sensus Divinitatis...

...philosopher Dr Alvin Plantinga states:

// The most serious noetic effects of sin have to do with our knowledge of God. Were it not for sin and its effects, God’s presence and glory would be as obvious and uncontroversial to us all as the presence of other minds, physical objects, and the past. Like any cognitive process, however, the sensus divinitatis can malfunction; as a result of sin, it has indeed been damaged. Our original knowledge of God and his glory is muffled and impaired; it has been replaced (by virtue of sin) by stupidity, dullness, blindness, inability to perceive God or to perceive him in his handiwork. Our knowledge of his character and his love toward us can be smothered: it can even be transformed into a resentful thought that God is to be feared and mistrusted; we may see him as indifferent or even malignant. //
- Dr Alvin Plantinga.

What Dr Plantinga is saying is that the Sensus Divinitatis malfunctions due to sin/immorality and its effects. So for example, the Sensus Divinitatis might naturally form the deep rooted sense/belief that God in His nature is maximally good; so that any inferential reasons formed on the bases of this fallen world for why God is not good, would never enjoy more justification/warrant than the Sensus Divinitatis informing one that God is good.

However, if the Sensus Divinitatis is corrupted it may not act as an intrinsic defeater to these inferential beliefs accusing God of not being good in His nature; even worse, the Sensus Divinitatis could be so corrupted it may form in itself a twisted understanding of who God is.

----------8: Three Possible Objections To Belief In God being Rationally Justified When Formed Via The Sensus Divinitatis & The Witness Of The Holy Spirit----------

I am now going to look at three possible objections which could be raised against the position that a non-inferential belief in God (formed via a natural sense of God [Sensus Divinitatis] or an experience of God’s presence/witness/leading [Witness Of The Holy Spirit]) is rationally justified.

I will only be referencing the first two objections, however, I will spend more time looking into the third objection; as I take this third objection more seriously. I will be answering the third objection from the position of a Christian Theist whom finds himself with a natural sense of God (Sensus Divinitatis) and whom has experienced the presence of God (Witness Of The Holy Spirit). I will now list these three objections...

(A) FIRST OBJECTION: This objection is based on the claim that a non-inferential belief in God (formed via a natural sense of Him or formed via an experience of Him) is not rationally justified. The problem here is that the objectors position is baseless and irrational unless the objector attempts to present some kind of a defeater (which is needed, since all basic beliefs rooted in an experience which gives one information about reality are [rational] to be believed in the absence of a defeater); this defeater could be in the form of rational reasons which would support the proposition ‘God does not exist’ over its opposite ‘God does exist,’ or, it could be in the form of rational reasons why the mechanisms themselves which form these non-inferential beliefs are unreliable.

The only other way the objector could substantiate this objection in the absence of presenting a defeater, is if he/she does two thing:

Firstly, he/she presents a separate epistemic model (other than the one I have presented in this article) and proves that this model is rationally more coherent than the one I presented.

Secondly, he/she proves that on this new epistemic model belief in God is not rationally justified (especially in the context of it being a non-inferential belief formed via the The Sensus Divinitatis & The Witness Of The Holy Spirit).

(B) SECOND OBJECTION: This objection is based on the claim that the Christians non-inferential belief in/about God was not formed via a natural sense of God or/and via the witness of His Spirit, but rather, it was formed via some kind of self deception; that is to say whatever faculty formed this non-inferential belief in God was not based on an experience which gives one information about reality, but rather, it was formed by some other cognitive mechanism like wishful thinking.

So on this scenario, the objector would say something like: “You don’t believe in God due to a natural sense you have of Him, rather you strongly wished you had a natural sense of God and your mind then tricked you into thinking you do indeed have a natural sense of God; thus you ended up forming your belief in God based on a trick of the mind.” This objection would also be applied the same way to a belief in God formed via the witness of the Holy Spirit.

(C) THIRD OBJECTION: This objection is based on the objector actually giving a defeater against the Sensus Divinitatis & the Witness Of The Holy Spirit, in the sense that they do not form reliable non-inferential beliefs. The most common way this defeater is presented (in fact the only way I know of it being presented) is by stating something like: “There are many people of many different religions, who also claim that they believe in God/Divinity/Deity due to a natural sense of Him and/or due to some experience of Him, however, these different religions/people have conflicting beliefs about God/Divinity/Deity which can not all be true; this shows me that the mechanisms forming these non-inferential beliefs are unreliable.”

It seems to me this defeater/objection is a very good one against the Christian Theist only if (one or all three) certain criteria are not true, I will list these three criteria:

1. FIRST CRITERIA: The Sensus/Witness is giving these other people reliable and similar non-inferential beliefs about core issues (like God exists), however, the other conflicting beliefs are coming from some other means (like their culture). In fact, this is exactly something a Christian Theist would expect to find (people coming to believe in God due to a natural sense of Him or an experience of His Spirit), since the Christian Theist tends to believe people generally do have a natural sense of God and that the Spirit of God is actively drawing people to Himself. So if this criteria is true, not only would the objectors defeater fail, but this would actually be confirming evidence which supports the Christian Theists beliefs.

2. SECOND CRITERIA: The Sensus/Witness is giving these other people reliable and similar non-inferential beliefs about core issues (like God exists), however, the other conflicting beliefs are coming from the parts of the Sensus Divinitatis (and ability to experience God) which are broken/damaged by sin. Again, this is exactly something a Christian Theist would expect to find (people coming to believe in God due to a natural sense of Him or an experience of His Spirit), since the Christian Theist tends to believe people generally do have a natural sense of God and that the Spirit of God is actively drawing people to Himself; however, the Christian Theist tends to also believe Man’s noetic faculties are damaged by sin and its effects. So if this criteria is true, not only would the objectors defeater fail, but this would actually be confirming evidence which supports the Christian Theists beliefs.

As the late and great theologian/philosopher Thomas Aquinas said: "To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature."

3. THIRD CRITERIA: These other religious people (other than the Christian Theist) are forming their beliefs via different mechanisms than the ones the Christian Theist is forming them by; even if these other religious people sound like they are appealing to the same mechanisms that the Christian Theist is appealing to. Personally, I think this criteria is true only in a handful of situations.

----------9: Knowing VS Showing: Rational Justification----------

I previously touched on the epistemic model of Foundationalism, however, this models has many different camps within it (based on nuances of rational justification/warrant). Two main and dividing camps which exist are Internalism and Exteranalism (there are also other minor camps, like phenomenal conservatism, reliablism, functionalism etc...).

Given the above, plus the nature of non-inferential beliefs, there can exist a distinction between one KNOWING a belief is rationally justified VS one SHOWING a belief is rationally justified.

I will give a crude example of this below:

(1) Inferential Beliefs = Can KNOW Rational Justification & Can Powerfully SHOW Rational Justification...
...inferential beliefs are usually based on two parties who have agreed and shared properly basic beliefs. From these properly basic beliefs one can show his interlocutor that a certain inferred belief is rationally justified. So in this case, Knowing VS Showing rational justification for a belief is basically on a one to one ratio.

(2) Non-Inferential Belief Via Internalism = Can KNOW Rational Justification & Can Moderately SHOW Rational Justification...

...Internalism is crudely the position that one’s non-inferential beliefs are rationally justified only if one has internal access as to how they were formed; for example I know my belief that ‘the sun is bright’ was formed via my sight. If one does not have internal access as to how a belief they happen to find themselves with was formed, on Internalism this belief would not be rationally justified.

In terms of SHOWING this non-inferential belief for rational justification to an interlocutor, one has two means by which to do this. I will list them both:

(A) Firstly, one could appeal to the testimony of their own experience; however, this is only powerful if the interlocutor trusts the witnesses cognitive faculties and integrity. I will give an example of this: Imagine a hearing enabled person trying to show (his belief) that there is a reality of sound (based on his experience) to a deaf person. The deaf person would only believe there is a reality of sound if indeed he trusts this hearing enabled persons cognitive faculties (that he is not as mad as a hatter) and trusts this hearing enabled persons integrity (that he is honest).

(B) Secondly, one could hold the position that their interlocutor shares the same mechanisms as he/she does which gave rise to the non-inferential belief in question, however, the interlocutor is somehow suppressing/silencing (whether knowingly or not) these mechanisms (or the belief itself). If this is the case, an appeal could be made for the interlocutor to pay special attention to these same mechanisms (or held belief).

(3) Non-Inferential Belief Via Externalism = Can KNOW Rational Justification & Can Weakly SHOW Rational Justification...

....Externalism is crudely the position that one’s non-inferential beliefs can be rationally justified even if one has no internal access as to how they were formed; Externalism (roughly) basis rational justification/warrant on external factors.

On this view it would be very hard to SHOW one has rational justification for a non-inferential belief, other than to appeal to the fact they have the belief in question (and that they have done their epistemic duty regarding it) and then state how this may be rationally justified given Externalism.

----------10: My Personal Thoughts & Experience----------

I want to base this section on asking myself two questions, then answering them for the reader to asses.

First Question: “Do you believe there is a Sensus Divinitatis & Witness Of The Holy Spirit?”

Answer: The short answer is “Yes I do.” This is based on my experience. I have experienced myself naturally being inclined to believe in God: that I have a natural inclination and sense that He exists (in various circumstances). Also, I have experienced the Spirit of God, in fact, I have experienced Him very powerfully (especially when I --for the first time-- truly repented of my sins).

Second Question: “Do you believe other people can/do experience the Sensus Divinitatis &/or Witness Of The Holy Spirit?”

Answer: In short, “Yes I do.” I will list five reasons for this and then I will expound on each reason individually; these reasons are:

(1) The testimony of certain passages in the canon of the Scripture.
(2) Certain reports via the social sciences.
(3) My own personal experience.
(4) Certain testimonies from ex-atheists.
(5) Certain testimonies from current atheists.

I will not expound on each of the reasons above.

(1) The testimony of certain passages in the canon of the Scripture...

I believe there are good reasons to hold that the Bible was authored from a reliable source, thus I believe there are good reasons to believe what it states (obviously such a position is full of nuance). So I will now post two passages from the Bible in relation to the question at hand (however, there exists more than these two passages in relation to this subject).

The first passage:

// Nevertheless I tell you the truth; It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you. And when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment: Of sin, because they believe not on me;... //
- John 16:7-9

Here the passage speaks about the witness of Spirit going out into the world in order to convict the world of certain truths.

The second passage:

// The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of people, who suppress the truth by their wickedness, since what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.
For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened. Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools... //
- Romans 1:18-22

Here the passages basically states it is very obvious that God exists --because God has set things up in nature so that it is obvious-- so that people rationally should believe in God. The passage then goes onto to say, however, certain people actively have/are suppressed/suppressing this obvious revelation of God’s existence.

(2) Certain reports via the social sciences....

The social scientists have obviously noted that the vast majority of people in the world today (and throughout history) actively hold belief in God/Deity/Divinity etc... The social sciences don’t tend to just see this as a very unlikely random event, rather they tend to put it down to some inbuilt natural tendencies humans have to form these beliefs about reality (i.e. Sensus Divinitatis). I will post the url address to three articles which sort of highlight this position.

The first article I will post uses some very similar terms to those found in Romans 1 above (the Bible). Here are some quotes from the said article:

// Three studies at Boston University found that even among atheists, the "knee jerk" reaction to natural phenomenon is the belief that they're purposefully designed by some intelligence, according to a report on the research in Cognition entitled the "Divided Mind of a disbeliever." //

// "Religious participants' baseline tendency to endorse nature as purposefully created was higher" than that of atheists, the study found. But non-religious participants "increasingly defaulted to understanding natural phenomena as purposefully made" when "they did not have time to censor their thinking," wrote the researchers. //

// The results suggest that "the tendency to construe both living and non-living nature as intentionally made derives from automatic cognitive processes, not just practiced explicit beliefs," the report concluded. //

Notice that in the second quote it says of the atheist that they “censor their thinking,” this sounds similar to Romans 1 which states “[non-believers] who suppress the truth.”

I will now post a link to the said article:
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/richard-dawkins-take-heed-even-atheists-instinc...

This second link is about the natural born inclination of babies to believe in God (belief in God being the position that Ultimate Reality is Personal in nature, instead of Ultimate Reality being Impersonal in nature):
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/3512686/Children-are-born-belie...

And the third link below:
http://www.psmag.com/blogs/news-blog/emotional-reactions-of-atheists-rev...

(3) My own personal experience...

It is reasonable to believe that I am not the only human who has the experiences which I do. For example, if I am stood next to someone on the street and I experience a car come whizzing past me, I am reasonable to assume that the person stood next to me just experienced the same thing I did.

Also then, if I perceive God via nature through a natural sense/inclination, I am reasonable to assume I am not the only one experiencing this. On top of this many people actively testify to having this natural sense/inclination to perceive the existence of God.

In terms of the witness of the Spirit, the Church is littered with testimonies of how non-believers in Christ became believers through the leading/drawing of the Spirit of God. I personally have conversed with many people who speak about their experiences with Holy Spirit. I will post just four testimonies which demonstrate this:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yehENU4s_Y&app=desktop
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruaoEB19S-w
https://www.facebook.com/oneforIsrael/videos/1009174195767206/
https://jamesbishopblog.wordpress.com/2015/06/12/professor-of-new-testam...

(4) Certain testimonies from ex-atheists...

I will give just two examples/quotes regarding this section:

"In 1993 Lee Strobel admitted that as an atheist, he was morally adrift but secretly wanted an anchor. In a personal interview with him, he told me he always knew God was real. He just suppressed that truth, knowing that admitting God's reality would require a change in lifestyle"
- Jonathon Mckee, Connet: Real Relationships in a World of Isolation, [Zondercan, 2009], p.67..

"Underneath the facade of atheism, I always knew there was a God. He just seemed so far away and in-consequential to the lifestyle I had chosen"
- J. Charles Roberts, Choose Your Addiction, p.3...

(5) Certain testimonies from current atheists...

I will --again-- give just two examples/quotes regarding this section.

The first example will be based on something the atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel said (who’s work I really enjoy, especially his book ‘Mind & Cosmos’). Nagel says something quite revealing while scathing his fellow secular academics for holding onto ‘scientism’ and ‘reductionism’ as strongly as they do (Nagel sees these views as being rationally deficient). Nagel thinks the real reason that ‘scientism’ and ‘reductionism’ are held so strongly by his secular piers, is not due to rational reason, but rather due to the fact they probably share the same disposition of a ‘ cosmic authority problem’ as he does, and that ‘scientism’ and ‘reductionism’ are a good way to distance oneself from the horrible belief God exists.

Here is the quote:

// I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that. My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about human life, including everything about the human mind. //
- Thomas Nagel (Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University), The Last Word, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 130-131...

Here is a second example/quote:

// I had motives for not wanting the world to have a meaning; and consequently assumed that it had none, and was able without any difficulty to find satisfying reasons for this assumption. The philosopher who finds no meaning in the world is not concerned exclusively with a problem in pure metaphysics. He is also concerned to prove that there is no valid reason why he personally should not do as he wants to do. For myself, as no doubt for most of my friends, the philosophy of meaninglessness was essentially an instrument of liberation from a certain system of morality. We objected to the morality because it interfered with our sexual freedom. The supporters of this system claimed that it embodied the meaning - the Christian meaning, they insisted - of the world. There was one admirably simple method of confuting these people and justifying ourselves in our erotic revolt: we would deny that the world had any meaning whatever. //
- Aldous Huxley...

----------11: My Philosophical Musings about Atheist Psychology----------

I am --again-- going to ask myself a question and answer it for the reader to asses; it is a question which naturally arises from my claim that professed atheists most likely have the Sensus Divinitatis.

Question: “What do you make of the fact that you are claiming most/all people have the Sensus Divinitatis, and yet, there are people who are professing atheists (people who usually claim they do not have the Sensus Divinitatis which forms a belief in God. Professing atheists do not normally admit to having the Sensus Divinitatis which they choose to ignore for irrational reasons, or, due to a defeater they think is rationally more warranted).”

Answer: The widest answer would be “Sin and its noetic effects,” a narrower answer would be “Self deception,” and an even narrower answer would be “Suppression.” I want to focus on this issue of “suppression”. I will list three possible ways suppression is happening (whether consciously or not):

(1) Perhaps the mechanisms which form a non-inferential belief in God are being suppressed (maybe even damaged). Perhaps actively by wishful thinking and desire not to let them work, or perhaps passively by just ignoring them (and maybe this has gone on so long that they are no longer even recognized; like a constant ringing sound in the background, if you ignore it long enough your mind just passively tunes it out).

(2) Perhaps belief in God is a belief which keeps popping up in certain circumstances instead of a belief which is constantly there. Maybe every time it pops up it is actively or passively suppressed somehow until it is gone again.

(3) Perhaps belief in God is constantly there in the (back of the) mind of a professing atheist, however, they are --again as above-- actively or passively suppressing it somehow. In fact this is something the late Christian Philosopher Greg Bahnsen believed (who’s presuppositional epistemology I actually disagree with BTW). Greg believed that a professed atheist both believed and did not believe in God, which led to a “Divided mind” (which are also the words used in the first social science article I posted concerning the professed atheist).

This sounds like a contradiction at first glance, how can someone believe (X) and not believe (X)? Well, Bahnsen held it as a paradox, Bahnsen said that the professing atheist truly believed in God but also truly believed that they don’t believe in God (thus eliminating what seems a contradiction); obviously, the belief that one does not believe in God would be false in this case (although it is truly held).

In fact, psychologists say this type of self deception is common. Here is link on it:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpEeSa6zBTE

Also, here is a link (below) looking at the issue of belief and non-belief in God via the cognitive sciences:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Ii-bsrHB0o&feature=youtu.be

----------12: Closing Note----------

I started this article by basically asking the question: “Can a person have a rational belief in God if they do not have any inferential argument/reason/evidence to support that belief?”

The answer to that question has been shown to be a “Yes.” Indeed, a person can have a rationally justified belief in God wholly apart from any inferential argument/reason/evidence to support that belief, as long as that belief is a non-inferential belief which is formed in a certain context.