Sheldon said:

"Let's break things down toddler style."

If you think it will help you understand how bizarrely silly your claim is then I'm all for it of course, but I don't hold out much hope I must say.

"1.) You "simply state" that not all beliefs are held absent proper evidence."

No, I simply state that this is axiomatic from the clear dictionary definition, you know the one you keep saying is irrelevant to a discussion about the word you are trying to redefine.
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"2.) You also ask if some beliefs are held with evidence, "how then can you make the blanket claim that beliefs contrast science?"."

Yes for once that is precisely what I asked. Now that you claim to have adopted toddler style reasoning perhaps we can expect you to progress to answering the question rather than just restating it?
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"3.) In simple words, your mind is still focussing on the reality that some beliefs are evidenced based/science agreeing,"

Silly me focusing on reality, but no this isn't true, I have clearly stated that the word definition encompasses beliefs held with and without proper evidence, it is you and not me who is trying to dishonestly focus on just the part of the definition that suits your agenda.

" but you blatantly ignore that the *concept* of belief is science opposing, as such a concept generally facilitates evidence ignorance."

No not ignore but rather reject your concept, since in the case of believing scientific facts this wouldn't be true would it ffs? Jesus wept this must be a windup?
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"4.) In even simpler terms, you confuse my expression: "the concept of belief is science opposing" with an expression I did not make: "all beliefs are science opposing"."

No I'm not confusing those two expressions at all. Your first claim is a silly generalisation that simply ignores the axiomatic fact that **believing scientific facts** cannot by definition be "science opposing", and the second one is simply a lie you keep repeating about what I have claimed.

This is bizarre, part of me has the uneasy feeling I must have been completely taken in by a master troll?

I shall further highlight a particular word, in toddler like fashion:

1.) How embarrasing for you. You are demonstrably confusing those expressions.

2.) That the concept of belief is *generally* science opposing, does not suddenly warrant that all beliefs oppose science.

3.) You ignored the usage of the word "generally", which indicates that belief may encompass both evidence, and non evidence; thus I had not ignored that belief may concern science.

In fact, I mention this on my website.

Oh dear!

Sheldon said:

Have you actually read any of that article you linked about belief? I'm not sure why you're citing papers that are so obviously at odds with your bizarre claims. Certainly even a cursory reading shows how absurd it is to suggest we could label belief a concept and suggest this 'concept' could be simply abandoned, as you keep claiming. How exactly do we expunge the cognitive processes that enable people to form beliefs, why would we want to anyway since that might well render humans unable to differentiate between true and false claims? The more espouse your idea the less sense it makes.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4327528/

DEFINING BELIEF
Belief can be defined as the mental acceptance or conviction in the truth or actuality of some idea (Schwitzgebel, 2010). According to many analytic philosophers, a belief is a “propositional attitude”: as a proposition, it has a specific meaning that can be expressed in the form of a sentence; as an attitude, it involves a mental stance on the validity of the proposition (Schwitzgebel, 2010). Beliefs thus involve at least two properties: (i) representational content and (ii) assumed veracity (Stephens and Graham, 2004). It is important to note, however, that beliefs need not be conscious or linguistically articulated. It is likely that the majority of beliefs remain unconscious or outside of immediate awareness, and are of relatively mundane content: for example, that one’s senses reveal an environment that is physically real, that one has ongoing relationships with other people, and that one’s actions in the present can bring about outcomes in the future. Beliefs thus typically describe enduring, unquestioned ontological representations of the world and comprise primary convictions about events, causes, agency, and objects that subjects use and accept as veridical.

Although obvious, beliefs are significant because they are held by us to be true and provide the basis for us to understand the world and act within it (Halligan, 2006). Beliefs, or perhaps more realistically belief systems, provide the ‘mental scaffolding’ for appraising the environment, explaining new observations, and constructing a shared meaning of the world (Halligan, 2007). Consider, for example, the fundamental and widespread effects of the transition from Ptolemaic astronomy to Copernican astronomy, from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics, or from a miasmatic theory to a germ theory of disease (see Kronemyer and Bystritsky, 2014). In a more immediate sense, beliefs allow us to interpret and appraise our ongoing experience, and to place our experience within a wider meaningful context involving the past and future. As such, beliefs can have significant emotional consequences. Beliefs also provide a basis for action by providing both a representation of the environment and a framework of goals and actions (Tullett et al., 2013). Given this overarching influence of belief on our experience, beliefs that are considered dysfunctional or inaccurate are often the target of psychological interventions (Beck, 1976; Young et al., 2003; Hofmann et al., 2012; Kronemyer and Bystritsky, 2014).

"CHARACTERISTICS AND DIMENSIONS OF BELIEF
Beliefs are best considered as being multidimensional. Beliefs share a number of common properties but can vary across dimensions within these properties. These include the following:

(1)
Beliefs have different origins. Beliefs, for example, can be formed through direct experience or by accepting information from a trusted or authoritative source (Hughes and Sims, 1997; Langdon, 2013).
(2)
Beliefs vary in terms of the level of evidence and support they command. Some beliefs have high levels of evidence, while others appear to be accepted without requiring much evidential support (Lamont, 2007).
(3)
Beliefs can said to be “held” at different levels of awareness. Whereas some beliefs may involve considerable conscious preoccupation and rumination (susceptible to reflective control), other beliefs may appear implicit, unconscious, and only evident by inference from behavior (not susceptible to reflective control; Young et al., 2003).
(4)
Beliefs vary considerably in generality and scope. Beliefs may refer, for example, to specific objects or individuals, groups of objects and people, or whole classes of objects and people (Freeman, 2007).
(5)
Beliefs vary in their degree of personal reference. A belief can be limited to the specific individual holding the belief (e.g., “I am unique”); extend to friends, relatives and other in-group members; or apply to other groups of people or all people equally (Freeman, 2007).
(6)
Beliefs can be held with different levels of conviction or degrees of confidence. This can range from firmly held (e.g., in the case of basic physical laws) to relative uncertainty (e.g., in the case of unfamiliar topics; Peters et al., 2004). In some beliefs, this conviction may even fluctuate over time or across different contexts (Bisiach et al., 1991; Connors and Coltheart, 2011).
(7)
Beliefs vary in their resistance to change in response to counter-evidence and social pressure. While related to conviction, people can also vary in how open they are to disconfirming evidence toward their belief and to considering alternative points of view.
(8)
Beliefs can vary in their impact on cognition and behavior. This may likewise be influenced by degree of conviction. Whereas people may act on some beliefs, they may fail to act on other beliefs that they verbally endorse (Bortolotti, 2013).
(9)
Beliefs can produce different emotional consequences. Whereas some beliefs may be relatively innocuous or even self-serving, other beliefs may cause considerable distress (Beck, 1976).
(10)
Beliefs vary in the degree to which they are shared by other people. Whereas some beliefs are very common, other beliefs may be comparatively unusual (e.g., in the case of some delusions; David, 1999)."

>>>>No, but I'm sure your idea to simply abandon beliefs and for humans to hold a non-belief state is a great idea.

1.) How typical of the believer (I am referring to you). He or she identifies something that may align with his/her opinion, and stops there, not searching for opposing evidence.

2.) Wrt to those introductory descriptions you cited, article also went on to say:

Article further said:
"There is, for example, no philosophical consensus on what belief is (McKay and Dennett, 2009) or even what constitutes a delusion (Spitzer, 1990; David, 1999; Coltheart, 2007)."

3.) Beyond the above, the article went on to say:

Furthermore, the article said:

"Belief evaluation, even in the absence of frank pathology, has several limitations. People tend to adopt non-optimal hypothesis-testing strategies (Evans, 1989; Gilovich, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 2006; Nickerson, 2008). People, for example, tend to seek confirmatory information that supports their belief and be overly influenced by this information, but neglect information that is critical of their belief (Nickerson, 1998, 2008). People may also use inefficient strategies that waste effort on non-diagnostic data (Fischoff and Beyth-Marom, 1983; Evans, 1989; Johnson-Laird, 2006) or focus on heuristics (Kahneman et al., 1982; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman, 2011; see also Gilovich et al., 2002). Indeed, the heuristic of anchoring and adjustment, which reflects the general tendency to rely on initial judgements and discount newly obtained information, means that knowledge received after the initial judgment may be distorted to fit the original hypothesis. In support of this, there is research suggesting that beliefs may persevere even when the initial evidence for the beliefs is discredited (Ross et al., 1975, 1977; Anderson et al., 1980). As a result of these biases, people can accept beliefs without sufficient evidence and also retain incorrect beliefs longer than would be case if they sought out diagnostic information. The collective impact of these tendencies is that people (i.e., their cognitive systems) are unlikely to seek information that contradicts their proto-belief, so long as the proto-belief is consistent with pre-existing beliefs or satisfies strong emotional drivers."

4.) Oh dear, does the embarrassment cease for you Sheldon?

5.) Advice: You ought to read beyond the introduction!